OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS Part I -Obligations CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS §1.00 Generally

Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n) Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a) Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen , by the provisions of this Book. (1090) Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. (1091a) Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book. (n)

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ARTICLE 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n) Meaning of obligation. The term obligation is derived from the Latin word "obligatio" which means a "tying" or "binding." (1) It is a tie of law or a juridical bond by virtue of which one is bound in favor of another to render something-and this may consist in giving a thing, doing a certain act, or not doing a certain act.

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Law & Philosophy (forthcoming)

Judges decide cases by appeal to rules of general application they deem to be law. If a candidate rule resolves the case and is, ex ante and independently of the judge's judgment, the law, then the judge has a legal obligation to declare it as such and follow it. That, at any rate, is conventional wisdom. Yet the principle is false—a rule's being law or the judge's believing it to be law is neither necessary nor even sufficient for a judge being legally obliged to follow it. The principle's falsity is especially apparent in so-called hard cases, where the line between legal and non-legal rules is obscure. Moreover, judges have authority to disregard law in hard cases not because moral (or non-legal) obligations trump legal obligations. Rather, the law itself circumscribes its own authority. The implications for legal philosophy are significant; for one, a theory of juridical norms can be developed independently of the precise boundaries of legality.

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